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 Abstract
Disclosure-control is a traditional statistical methodology for protecting privacy when data is
released for analysis. Disclosure-control methods have enjoyed a revival in the data mining com-
munity, especially after the introduction of the k-anonymity model by Samarati and Sweeney.
Algorithmic advances on k-anonymisation provide simple and effective approaches to protect pri-
vate information of individuals via only releasing k-anonymous views of a data set. Thus, the k-
anonymity model has gained increasing popularity. Recent research identifies some drawbacks of
the k-anonymity model and presents enhanced k-anonymity models. This paper reviews problems of
the k-anonymity model and its enhanced variants, and different methods for implementing k-ano-
nymity. It compares the k-anonymity model with the secure multiparty computation-based privacy-
preserving techniques in the data mining literature. The paper also discusses further development
directions of the k-anonymous data releasing.
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 0. Feedbacks from
ehPASS’06
 
This paper has attracted the interest
of health researchers as a comprehen-
sive review of new techniques for pri-
vacy preserving data publishing. Most
discussed methods not only protect
personal identifications in a published
data set, but remove possible infer-
ence channels for private information.
They make strong protections of pri-
vacy in data. However, a major con-
cern is that the utility of published
data is reduced if a strong model is
employed. In most applications where
data exchange is largely between dif-
ferent medical professionals, the k-
anonymity model is sufficient. How-
ever, when data are published in a
wide community, where malicious
users may try to hack private informa-
tion, the strong models are definitely
useful. In addition, currently there is
no legislation clarifying how strong
protection is required. The applica-
tion of new techniques also relies on
the future legislative development. 
 
1. Introduction
 
Various organisations, such as hos-
pitals, medical administrations and
insurance companies, have collected a
large amount of data over years. How-
ever, gold nuggets in these data are
unlikely to be discovered if the data is
locked in data custodians’ storage. A
major risk of releasing data for public
research is revealing the private infor-
mation of individuals in data. 
Disclosure-control [1, 2, 3, 4] is a
traditional approach for privacy-pre-
serving data releasing. Most of them
concentrate on maintaining statistical
properties of data. Disclosure-control
study attracts increasing interest the
data mining community due to pri-
vacy concerns in powerful data min-
ing processes. The data mining
community aims to build strong pri-
vacy-preserving models and to design
efficient, optimal and scalable heuris-
tic solutions. Data perturbation [5, 6,
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7] and the 
 
k
 
-anonymity model [8, 9,
10] are two major techniques to
achieve the goal. Data perturbation
methods are not for all but only for
some specific data mining functional-
ities [5, 6, 7]. The 
 
k
 
-anonymity model
has been extensively studied recently
because of its simplicity and general
effectiveness, [11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16]. 
 An alternative methodology for
privacy preservation is based on
Secure Multiparty Computation
(SMC) techniques [17, 18], where
SMC is used to ensure that nothing
should be revealed during the data
mining process [19, 20, 21, 22]. In
comparison with the disclosure-con-
trol data releasing methodology, the
SMC-based methodology is usually
inefficient. Disclosure control is more
efficient and gives users more flexibil-
ities for using data. Therefore, disclo-
sure-control data releasing, such as 
 
k
 
-
anonymity, has a great potential for
immediate real world applications. 
In the rest of this paper, we intro-
duce the 
 
k
 
-anonymity model and dis-
cuss how it protects private
information in data in Section 2. We
then discuss problems associating
with the 
 
k
 
-anonymity model and
some enhanced models to overcome
these problems in Section 3. After
that we summarise major techniques
for implementing 
 
k
 
-anonymisation in
Section 4. In Section 5, we compare
relative strengths and weaknesses of
 
k
 
-anonymisation with SMC-based
privacy-preserving techniques.
Finally, we conclude the paper and
discuss some possible future direc-
tions.
 
2. 
 
k
 
-anonymity model
 
Many organisations are increas-
ingly sharing data by exchanging or
publishing raw data containing un-
aggregated information about individ-
uals. The data is normally de-identi-
fied. Names, medical care card
numbers, and addresses are removed.
It is assumed that individual is not
identifiable and hence their privacy,
such as medical conditions, is pro-
tected. 
However, such a de-identification
procedure does not guarantee the pri-
vacy of individuals in the data.
Sweeney reported that 87% of the
population of the United States can be
uniquely identified by the combina-
tions of attributes: gender, date of
birth, and 5-digit zip code [23].
Sweeney also showed that the medi-
cal records of the governor of Massa-
chusetts are supposedly anonymous
but his medical data are uniquely
identified by a linking attack. Gender,
date of birth and zip code attributes
were used in the linking attack by
linking Massachusetts voter registra-
tion records, which include name,
gender, zip code, and date of birth, to
medical records, which include gen-
der, zip code, date of birth as well as
medical conditions.
Though explicit identifiers are
removed from a data set, some
attributes, for example, gender, date
of birth and postcode in the above
example, can potentially identify
individuals in populations. Such a set
of attributes is called a 
 
quasi-identi-
fier
 
. Samarati and Sweeney proposed
a model for privacy protection called
 
k-anonymity 
 
[8, 23, 10]. A data set
satisfies 
 
k
 
-anonymity if every record
in the data set is identical to at least (
 
k
– 
 
1) other records with respect to the
set of quasi-identifier attributes; and
such a data set is so-called 
 
k-anony-
mous
 
. As a result, an individual is
indistinguishable from at least (
 
k – 
 
1)
individuals in a
 
 k-
 
anonymous data set.
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For example, Table 1 shows a sim-
plified medical data set. It does not
contain personal identification
attributes, such as name, address, and
medical care card number. However,
the unique combinations of gender,
age and postcode still reveal sensitive
information of individuals. For
instance, the first record is unique in
these three attributes, and the patient
is potentially identifiable. As a result,
depression condition of the patient
may be revealed by unique combina-
tions, such as records 1, 2 and 5.
To avoid privacy breaching, Table 1
can be modified to Table 2. In Table 2,
age is grouped into intervals, and
postcodes are clustered into large
areas. Symbol ‘*’ denotes any digit. A
record in the quasi-identifier is identi-
cal to at least 3 other records, and
therefore, no individual is identifia-
ble.
 
k
 
-anonymisation becomes popular
in data publishing because of its sim-
plicity and the availability of many
algorithms. However, the 
 
k
 
-anonym-
ity model may still reveal sensitive
information under some attacks, and
hence does not guarantee privacy. We
discuss its enhanced models in the
following section.
 
3. Enhanced 
 
k
 
-
anonymity models
 
The 
 
k
 
-anonymity model may reveal
sensitive information under the fol-
lowing two types of attacks [24].
 
1. Homogeneity attack to a 
 
k
 
-ano-
nymity table: 
 
Bob and Tom are two
hostile neighbours. Bob knows that
Tom goes to hospital recently and
tries to find out the disease Tom suf-
fers. Bob finds the 4-anonymous table
as in Table 2. He knows that Tom is
42 years’ old and lives in the suburb
with postcode 4350. Tom must be
record 9, 10, 11, or 12. All four
patients are alcohol addiction suffer-
ers. Bob knows for sure that Tom suf-
fers alcohol addiction.
Therefore, homogeneous values in
the sensitive attribute of a 
 
k
 
-anony-
mous group leak private information.
 
Quasi identifier Other attributes Sensitive attributes
 
Gender Age Postcode Diagnosis
1  
 
 
 
male 25 4350 …   …   … depression
2  male 27 4351 …   …   … depression
3  male 22 4352 …   …   … flu
4  male 28 4353 …   …   … flu
5   female 34 4352 …   …   … depression
6  female 31 4352 …   …   … Flu
7  female 38 4350 …   …   … alcohol addiction
8  female 35 4350 …   …   … alcohol addiction
9   m
ale
42 4351 …   …   … alcohol addiction
10   male 42 4350 …   …   … alcohol addiction
11  male 45 4351 …   …   … alcohol addiction
12  male 45 4350 …   …   … alcohol addiction
 
Table 1. A raw medical data set
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2. Background knowledge attack
to a 
 
k
 
-anonymity table: 
 
Bob and
Alice are friends and Bob does not
want Alice to know his medical con-
dition. Alice knows Bob goes to hos-
pital, but does not know what the
medical problem is. She finds the 4-
anonymous table containing Bob’s
record. Bob is 25 years old and lives
in suburb with postcode 4352. Bob’s
record must be record 1, 2, 3 or 4.
Based on the table, Alice does not
know whether Bob suffers depression
or flu. However, she knows Bob did
not have flu for a long time. So, Alice
knows nearly for sure that Bob suffers
depression.
Therefore, 
 
k
 
-anonymity does not
protect individuals from a back-
ground knowledge attack.
Machanavajjhala 
 
et al. 
 
presented an
 
/
 
-diversity model to enhance the 
 
k
 
-
anonymity model [24]. The /
 
-
 
diver-
sity principle is described as the fol-
lowing. A 
 
k
 
-anonymous group in a
disclosed table contains at least  
 
/ 
 
well
represented values in the sensitive
attribute. For example, records 5, 6, 7
and 8 in Table 2 form a 3-diverse
group. The records contain three val-
ues with the frequencies of 25%, 25%
and 50%, and no value is dominant.
However, making every 
 
k
 
-anonymous
group include 
 
l
 
 balanced values of a
released data set may diminish the
usefulness of information in the
quasi-identifier in the data set.
A practical model normally trades
strong protection with data utility.
The 
 
/
 
-diversity model is strong, but
may not be practical. If we try to pro-
tect every value in the sensitive
attributes, it may be better not to pub-
lish either sensitive attributes or the
quasi-identifier. Especially for the
background knowledge attack, how
much knowledge should we assume
an adversary has? If an adversary has
very strong background knowledge,
any published data is not safe.
A more practical approach is not to
consider every value in the sensitive
attribute as sensitive. For example,
people may want to keep depression
as private, but not flu and viral infec-
tions. If we only have a small number
of sensitive vales, a reasonable pro-
tection is that the inference confi-
dence from a group of 
 
k
 
-anonymous
records to a sensitive value is below a
threshold. This is the basic idea of (
 
a
,k
 
)-anonymity model [25]. This
model keeps the inference confidence
to sensitive values lower than  
 
a
 
, a
user defined threshold. This model is
simple and effective to prevent some
sensitive values from homogeneity
attacks. An example of (
 
a
 
,
 
 k
 
)-anony-
mous table is given in Table 3. In this
example, flu and viral infections are
not considered as sensitive, the infer-
ence confidence from (female & 30-
39 & 435*) to depression is 25%.     
Another model to prevent homoge-
neity attack in classification is the
template-based model [26]. This
model allows users to specify what
types of inference channels should be
blocked in the released data as tem-
plates. The model tries to eliminate
the sensitive inferences in a released
data set, and to preserve the classifica-
tion value of the data. The model
keeps the confidence of sensitive
 
Quasi identifier Other attributes Sensitive attributes
 
Gender Age Postcode Diagnosis
1 male 20-29 435* …   …   … depression
2 male 20-29 435* …   …   … depression
3 male 20-29 435* …   …   … flu
4 male 20-29 435* …   …   … flu
5 female 30-39 435* …   …   … depression
6 female 30-39 435* …   …   … flu
7 female 30-39 435* …   …   … alcohol addiction
8 female 30-39 435* …   …   … alcohol addiction
9 male 40-49 435* …   …   … alcohol addiction
10 male 40-49 435* …   …   … alcohol addiction
11 male 40-49 435* …   …   … alcohol addiction
12 male 40-49 435* …   …   … alcohol addiction
 
Table 2. A 4-anonymous view of Table 1
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inferences from a group of individu-
als to sensitive values lower than the
user specified levels. This model is
good for users who know exactly
what inferences are damaging, but is
not suitable for users who do not.
 
       Figure 1: Two examples of domain hierarchies. One for categorical values and one for numerical values.
 
4. Various 
 
k
 
-
anonymisation methods
 
There are several different methods
to modify a data set to be 
 
k
 
-anony-
mous, or so called 
 
k
 
-anonymisation
methods. We outline these techniques
in this section.
 
Generalisation: 
 
A common way
for 
 
k
 
-anonymisation is achieved by
generalisation — an attribute value is
generalised according to its attribute
domain hierarchy. For example, date
of birth Date/Month/Year is replaced
by Month/Year. All attribute domains
are in hierarchical structures.
Domains with fewer values are more
general than domains with more val-
ues for an attribute. The most general
domain contains only one value. For
example, date of birth in Date/Month/
Year is a lower level domain, and date
of birth in Year is a higher level
domain. The most general level of
date of birth domain contains value
unknown ‘*’ (or Any). Numerical
attributes are in a hierarchical struc-
ture too. That is {value, interval, *}.
Intervals can be determined by users
or a machine learning algorithm, say,
a discretisation method. As illustrated
in Figure 1, 10 year interval level in
date birth domain is more general
than year level.
 
Global recoding and local recod-
ing anonymisation methods 
 
are two
ways to achieve 
 
k
 
-anonymity.
Another name for global recoding is
full domain generalisation. In global
recoding, the generalisation happens
at the attribute domain level. When an
attribute value is generalised, every
 
Quasi identifier Other attributes Sensitive attributes
 
Gender Age Postcode Diagnosis
1  
 
 
 
male 20-29 435* …   …   … flu
2  male 20-29 435* …   …   … flu
3  male 20-29 435* …   …   … flu
4  male 20-29 435* …   …   … flu
5   female 30-39 435* …   …   … depression
6  female 30-39 435* …   …   … flu
7  female 30-39 435* …   …   … viral infections
8  female 30-39 435* …   …   … viral infections
 
Table 3. A (0.25, 4)-anonymous table
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occurrence of the value is replaced by
the new generalised value. Many
methods are global recoding models,
such as [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 27].
DataFly [9] and Incognito [27] are
two typical ones. An advantage of
global recoding is that an anonymous
view has uniform domains, but it may
unnecessarily lose many detailed
information.
It is possible to optimise a global
recoding method when the quasi-
identifier is not large. The optimisa-
tion here is in terms of minimising
generalisation steps to achieve 
 
k 
 
ano-
nymity. Incognito [27] and 
 
k
 
-optimise
[14] are two examples. However, the
time complexity of optimal search is
ultimately exponential to the size of
quasi-identifier though it is substan-
tially faster than the naive search.
These optimal algorithms only per-
form well on data with small quasi-
identifiers.
A major problem with global
recoding methods is that they over-
generalise the tables and result in
many unnecessary distortions. We use
an example to show this. Suppose that
we have 1000 records, among which
only two are uniquely identifiable
according to their postcodes. General-
isation of all postcode values to
accommodate these two records into a
 
k
 
-anonymous table causes too much
distortion in the postcode column.
A local-recoding method general-
ises attribute values at cell level. A
generalised attribute value co-exists
with the original value. A local recod-
ing method does not over-generalise a
table and hence may minimise the
distortion of an anonymous view. In
the above example regarding over-
generalisation problem of the global
recoding generalisation, a solution in
local recoding will only generalise the
two records with other (
 
k - 
 
2) records.
Optimal local recoding, which is to
minimise distortions of a data set for
 
k
 
-anonymisation, is NP-hard as dis-
cussed in [15, 16]. A local recoding
method has to be heuristic, but it gen-
erally produces less distortions. More
recent work of local recoding k-ano-
nymisation was reported in [25, 28,
29].
In order to make the information
loss as low as possible, the software
 
µ
 
-ARGUS [4] aims to reach a good
balance between global recoding and
local suppression, where attribute val-
ues are replaced by a missing value. It
starts by recoding some variables glo-
bally until the number of unsafe com-
binations that have to be protected by
local suppression is sufficiently low.
It allows a user to specify the global
recoding interactively, by providing
the user with necessary auxiliary
information. A user may also decide
to let 
 
µ
 
-ARGUS eliminate unsafe
combinations automatically, which
will involve the solution of a complex
optimisation problem [4]. 
 
µ
 
-ARGUS
does not guarantee 
 
k
 
-anonymity as
discovered in [9]. Following a similar
strategy as 
 
µ
 
 -ARGUS for microdata,
 
t
 
-ARGUS [4] is developed for the dis-
closure control of tabular data. 
 
t
 
-
ARGUS works efficiently only on
limited number of attributes.
 
k
 
-anonymisation via clustering
 
: A
more general view of 
 
k
 
-anonymisa-
tion is clustering with a constraint of
the minimum number of objects in
every cluster [30]. A number of meth-
ods that deal with numerical attributes
approach identity protection by clus-
tering [6, 31] have been proposed. A
recent work [32] extends a clustering
based method [33] to ordinal
attributes, but neither deals with
attributes in hierarchical structures.
Other work [15, 16] dealing with cat-
egorical attributes does not consider
attribute hierarchies. Li 
 
et al. 
 
[29]
recently presented a method achiev-
ing 
 
k
 
-anonymity in hierarchical
attribute structures by local recoding.
 
5. Comparison of 
 
k
 
-
anonymity model with 
SMC-based approaches
 
The definition of privacy-preserv-
ing in SMC (Secure Multiparty Com-
putation)-based approaches [21, 34]
is different from that of the 
 
k
 
-ano-
nymity model. It ensures that nothing
other than the final data mining
results are revealed during the data
mining process. In other words, no
data miner sees identifications or sen-
sitive attribute values in data. This
definition is closer to the definition of
security used in SMC techniques ini-
tially suggested by Yao [17].
As we mentioned above, both 
 
k-
anonymity and SMC are used in pri-
vacy-preserving data mining, but they
are quite different in terms of effi-
ciency, accuracy, security and privacy
as shown in Figure 2.
The k-anonymity provides a formal
way of privacy protection by prevent-
ing from re-identification of data
more than a group of k entities, and
the data with k-anonymity can be
used straightway by various parties.
However, the application of SMC is
inefficient. The notion of computa-
tional indistinguishability is crucial to
SMC. A distribution of numbers is
said to be computationally indistin-
guishable from another distribution of
numbers if no polynomial time pro-
gram can distinguish the two distribu-
tions. Goldreich et al. proved that any
problem representable as a circuit can
be securely solved [35], but the com-
putation cost depends on the input’s
size. Such a generic method based on
circuit evaluation is expensive (even
for small inputs) and the computa-
tional cost is prohibitive for large
inputs. Thus, generic SMC protocols
are impractical for the achievement of
SMC since large inputs are typically
required in data mining. Therefore,
the k-anonymity model and its vari-
ants are more efficient than techn-
niques based on generic SMC
protocols. However, in the real world,
rather than using a perfect SMC pro-
tocol with nothing revealed, more
efficient but not completely secure
protocols can be used in which we are
able to clearly prove what is known
and what remains secret. In this direc-
tion, there are several research efforts
to improve the computation efficiency
[21, 34, 36].
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                  Figure 2: K-anonymity and SMC
A SMC-based solution provides
exactly what is revealed. During k-
anonymisation, the key step is to gen-
eralise attribute values. For example,
the ages 22 and 25 in Table 1 could be
generalised to an interval [20 - 29] in
Table 2. Data values in a k-anony-
mous table are modified to satisfy the
anonymity feature for privacy protec-
tion. This largely trades off the accu-
racy in data mining. In contrast, a
SMC-based solution provides exactly
what is revealed.
A general definition of privacy
commonly accepted is to protect only
the actual data values during transac-
tions. Privacy is preserved if none of
the data is known exactly. A stronger
definition of privacy has initiated by
the cryptographic community. For
example, Yao [18] proposed a seman-
tic definition of it: information com-
municated between parties won’t
enable one party to compute any pol-
ynomial time predicates with greater
accuracy than they could without the
communication. On the other hand,
the k-anonymity model aims to pro-
tect just the (exact) actual data values.
Privacy is preserved in the k-anonym-
ity model when no exact values are
learned. The security definition of the
k-anonymity model is much weaker
than the one in the SMC model.
Almost all the SMC-based
approaches may suffer privacy infer-
ence vulnerability [37], because they
do not consider the privacy risk
caused by the release of final result
[38]. For example, via a SMC-based
approach, the following association
rule from a binary table is released.
  (support = 99;
confidence = 99%] 
It means that 99 individuals have
 and  and  simultaneously.
According to the association rule def-
inition [38], one may easily derive
that 100 (support  confidence = 99 /
99.0%) individuals have both  and
. This means that one and only one
individual in the data has and 
but not . Thus  is
unique. This association rule could be
used a key for a linking attack. As a
comparison, enhanced k-anonymity
models focus on eliminating this kind
of privacy threats.
6. Conclusions and 
discussions
In this paper, we have introduced k-
anonymity model and discussed how
it protects private information in data.
We have outlined typical problems
associating with the k-anonymity
model and considered some enhanced
models to overcome the problems. We
have summarised major techniques
implementing k-anonymisation. We
also have simply compared the k-ano-
nymity model with the Secure Multi-
party Computation (SMC)-based
techniques, in terms of efficiency,
accuracy and security.
There are several problems of the k-
anonymity model and its variants. 
• One is how to determine quasi-
identifiers during k-anonymisation 
of a data set. In other words, which 
kinds of other data sources would 
be used to construct a linking 
attack? The problem is arguably the 
same as which kind of background 
knowledge an attacker would have. 
This problem may be difficult for 
both data custodians and privacy-
preserving technique developers to 
answer.
• The second one is how to choose an 
optimal parameter k for the k-ano-
nymity model for a given data set. 
A similar problem is what the best 
trade-off between privacy protec-
tion and data accuracy is.
• Do these enhanced k-anonymity 
models, such as l-diversity or 
(alpha, k)-anonymity, guarantee 
privacy? If not, is the underlying 
principle of SMC able to be used to 
further enhance these models? Is 
there a model which guarantees pri-
vacy theoretically?
• As for the potential privacy infer-
ence vulnerability of the SMC-
321 aaa →∧
1a 2a 3a
1a
2a
1a 2a
3a 321 aaa ¬∧∧
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based privacy preserving tech-
niques discussed in Section 6, can 
the k-anonymity model or its vari-
ants be used to enhance these SMC-
based techniques?
• A data set can be anonymised in 
different ways. How do we measure 
the quality of various k-anonymous 
tables?
• When more than one k-anonymous 
table are released due to the update, 
are there any risks for privacy 
breaching?
Most of these problems are crucial
to the real world applications of k-
anonymous data releasing. We leave
them as future research directions.
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